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he Dutch pension fund system, considered among the 
best in the world, successfully combines a ﬁ  rst-pillar 
ﬂ  at-rate pension for all residents with a labor-related 
second pillar and voluntary savings accounts as the third pil-
lar. Th   is paper describes the main institutional characteristics 
of the Dutch pension fund system and its evolution over the 
past few decades. Th   e Dutch way is put in perspective by 
highlighting the diﬀ  erences between Dutch pension fund gov-
ernance and that of the United Kingdom and United States, 
with an emphasis on the Dutch adherence to collective risk-
sharing. Pension plan redesign, however, is inevitable because 
the increasing maturity of pension funds in a more volatile 
economy makes the deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plan structure unsustain-
able. Pension funds will link beneﬁ  ts increasingly to ﬁ  nancial 
market performance.
Introduction
Pension systems around the world are going through chal-
lenging times. Aging societies are facing increasing diﬃ   culties 
ﬁ  nancing their pay-as-you-go systems, while the credit crisis 
is putting stress on funded pension plans. In response, many 
countries have increased the retirement age or at least started 
tough discussions on doing so in the near future. Countries 
with funded pension plans are examining ways to make them 
more robust. Th   e Dutch pension fund system is considered 
among the best in the world1 because it successfully combines 
a ﬁ  rst-pillar ﬂ  at-rate pension for all residents with a labor-
related second pillar and voluntary savings accounts as the 
third pillar. More than 90 percent of the labor force is ade-
quately covered by a pension plan and the assets accumulated 
by all pension funds amount to 130 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). To inform the current pension reform discus-
sion, this article presents the following:
•  the most important characteristics of the Dutch system
•  the institutional structure of the three-pillar Dutch system
•  the evolution of Dutch pension plans over the past few 
decades
•  some of the main diﬀ  erences between Dutch pension fund 
governance and that of the United Kingdom and United 
States, with an emphasis on the Dutch adherence to col-
lective risk-sharing




As in most developed countries, the pension system in the 
Netherlands is organized as a three-pillar system. Th  e  ﬁ  rst 
pillar comprises the public pension plan, oﬀ  ering a ﬂ  at-rate 
pension to all retirees based on the number of years they have 
lived in the Netherlands. Financing is on a pay-as-you-go 
basis and beneﬁ  ts keep pace with the legal minimum wage. 
Th   e second pillar provides retired workers with additional 
income from supplementary plans. Most second-pillar plans 
are mandatorily funded deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t (DB) plans, which 
are oﬀ  ered by around 500 pension funds. More than 90 per-
cent of the Dutch labor force is covered by these funds; the 
remainder are self-employed or employed in companies that 
have fewer than ten employees. Finally, the third pillar com-
prises voluntary personal savings.
Second-Pillar Pension Funds
Th   ere are three types of second-pillar pension funds in the 
Netherlands. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is the industry-wide pension fund, 
organized for a speciﬁ  c sector of industry (e.g., construction, 
health care, or transport). Participation in an industry-wide 
pension fund is mandatory for all ﬁ  rms operating in the 
sector. A corporation can opt out only if it establishes a cor-
porate pension fund that oﬀ  ers a better pension plan to its 
employees than the industry-wide fund. Where a supplemen-
tary pension plan exists, either as a corporate pension fund or 
as an industry-wide pension fund, participation by workers is 
mandatory and governed by collective labor agreements. Th  e 
third type of pension fund is the professional group pension 
fund, organized for a speciﬁ  c group of professionals such as 
physicians or notaries.
Th   e Dutch pension fund system is one of the largest in the 
world. Table 1 and ﬁ  gure 1 provide information on the relative 
size of the various types of pension funds. No mandatory 
pension plans exist for the self-employed; this group needs to 
arrange retirement plans in the third pillar.
Th   e value of assets under management at the end of 
2010 amounted to €750 billion (more than US$1 trillion), 
or approximately 130 percent of Dutch GDP. More than 80 
percent of all pension funds are of the corporate pension fund 
type. Of the remaining 18 percent, most are industry-wide 
funds, besides a small number of professional group funds. 
Th   e industry-wide pension funds are the dominant players, 
both in terms of their relative share of total active participants 
(>85 percent) and assets under management (>70 percent). 
More than 400 corporate pension funds encompass more 
than one-quarter of the remaining assets. Th   e twelve profes-
sional group pension funds have on average almost €2 billion 
under management.
Compared to other countries, the Dutch pension fund 
system ranks fourth in total assets under management and is 
the largest relative to annual GDP (see table 2).
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TABLE 1: PENSION FUNDS IN THE NETHERLANDS
 2007 2008 2009 2010
All pension funds     
Assets under management (billion euro) 684.1 577.5 666.2 748.0
Funding ratio 144% 95% 109% 107%
# of pension funds 712 654 578 513
# of active plan members 5,559,000 5,599,000 5,507,000 5,472,000
Corporate pension funds
Assets under management (billion euro) 182 157 175 190
Funding ratio 146% 102% 116% 112%
# of pension funds 604 547 479 419
# of active plan members 669,000 657,000 644,000 607,000
Industry-wide pension funds
Assets under management (billion euro) 483 404 473 538
Funding ratio 142% 93% 106% 105%
# of pension funds 96 95 87 82
# of active plan members 4,843,000 4,899,000 4,812,000 4,812,000
Professional group pension funds
Assets under management (billion euro) 19.7 16.3 18.4 20.0
Funding ratio 164% 108% 124% 117%
# of pension funds 12 12 12 12
# of active plan members 46,000 43,000 51,000 53,000
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, www.dnb.nl (2011)
Across European funds, apart from diﬀ  erences in the 
size of funds in absolute terms and relative to GDP, there are 
important diﬀ  erences in asset allocation. Figure 2 provides 
an international comparison of risk-taking and shows that 
the Netherlands holds an in-between position between high 
risk proﬁ  les in most Anglo-Saxon countries, on the one hand, 
and a more-conservative risk proﬁ  le in most of continental 
Europe (e.g., Germany) on the other.
In the snapshot of the current risk proﬁ  le of countries, the 
Netherlands appears in the top tier. However, Dutch pension 
funds have only gradually increased their exposure to risky 
assets in recent decades, from around 10 percent in the late 
1980s to a new high of around 60 percent in 2010 (see ﬁ  gure 
3). Moreover, up until the mid-1990s virtually all assets were 
invested domestically, but since then the portfolio has been 
internationally diversiﬁ  ed. No more than 10 percent of total 
pension assets currently are invested inside the Netherlands.
Evolution of Pension Fund Plans over Time
From Traditional DB to Hybrid DB Plans with 
Conditional Indexation
Originating in the 1950s, pension funds in the Netherlands 
were set up initially as traditional DB plans, similar to those 
in the United States and United Kingdom. Over the past 
quarter century, DB plans in those countries have largely 
been displaced by individual deﬁ  ned contribution (DC) plans, 
while most pension plans in the Netherlands have maintained 
their DB structure. Within this structure, however, the Dutch 
funds have undergone signiﬁ  cant change. In 2003, in the wake 
of the collapse in funding levels from the dot-com bust, the 
Dutch government imposed strict funding requirements and 
new accounting rules. In response, in order to improve risk 
management, most pension funds switched to what may be 
called “hybrid” DB plans with conditional indexation while 
others shifted even further to collective DC plans.2
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In the hybrid DB plans with 
conditional indexation, beneﬁ  ts are 
calculated as in traditional DB plans 
except that indexation of pensions in 
payment and accrued beneﬁ  ts is 
conditional on the plan’s funding status. 
A key variable is the nominal funding 
ratio, deﬁ  ned as the market value of 
assets over the market value of nominal 
liabilities based on the nominal yield 
curve. Th   e relationship between the 
funding position and the indexation 
often is organized via a “policy ladder,” 
which links indexation to the funding 
level (compare ﬁ  gure 4). Full indexation 
is given when the nominal funding ratio 
is higher than a speciﬁ  ed threshold, 
typically around 125 to 135 percent; no 
indexation is given when the ratio falls 
below a lower threshold, typically 
around 105 percent; and partial 
indexation is given when the ratio is in 
between these thresholds. A policy 
ladder also may include changes in 
contribution rates relative to the 
thresholds. While pension fund 
policymakers have the ﬁ  nal say in 
determining beneﬁ  ts and contribution 
rates, policy ladders are intended to 
provide speciﬁ  c guidance to steer fund 
sponsors through diﬃ   cult periods.
Collective DC plans are similar 
to hybrid DB plans with one main 
exception: Contribution rates are ﬁ  xed 
for at least ﬁ  ve years and beneﬁ  ts are 
cut when the funding ratio falls below 
a certain predetermined level. Because 
all risks are borne by plan members and 
the employer no longer assumes risk, 
TABLE 2: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON (2009)
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Source: OECD (2011, p. 179)
FIGURE 2: PENSION FUND ASSET ALLOCATION IN OECD COUNTRIES (2009)
FIGURE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF DUTCH PENSION SYSTEM EQUITY EXPOSURE
Source: OECD (2011, p. 181)
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, www.dnb.nl (2011)
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2.  Maintain contribution rates at current levels.
3.  Achieve a better balance between target pensions in real 
terms, certainty, and costs.
4.  Maintain intergenerational fairness and share risks fairly.
5.  Make pension contracts “as complete and transparent as 
possible.”
To achieve these ﬁ  ve goals, plan redesign is required. 
Th   e most important proposal is to link pension beneﬁ  ts 
explicitly to investment performance and forego any 
(nominal) guarantees in the pension promise. Another 
a collective DC plan qualiﬁ  es as a DC plan and is treated as 
such under the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), which is attractive for the sponsoring companies of 
corporate funds (see sidebar for a more detailed description 
of plan features).
Ongoing Debate on a Fundamental 
Pension System Redesign
Following the restructuring of most Dutch pension plans in 
the early 2000s, the average funding ratio slowly recovered. 
However, from 2007 onward, the funding ratio fell dramati-
cally, from a high of 150 percent in mid-2007 to less than 90 
percent in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 (see ﬁ  gure 5). Th  e  drop 
resulted from the combined eﬀ  ect of the worldwide fall in 
stock prices and the decline in nominal interest rates, which 
drove up the (market) value of the plans’ nominal liabilities. 
Economic conditions deteriorated most dramatically in the 
fall of 2008, raising concerns that the default indexation 
adjustments might not be enough to recover the minimum 
funding level required.
In the aftermath of the sharp decline in the funding 
position in 2008, representatives of labor unions, employers, 
and the government started negotiations on a plan redesign 
in order to make the system more shock-resilient. Two types 
of shocks in particular have been considered: 1) shocks in life 
expectancy and 2) ﬁ  nancial market shocks. Th  e  negotiators 
discussed possible solutions to make pension beneﬁ  ts more 
dependent on ﬁ  nancial market performance and explored 
adjusting the retirement age periodically due to anticipated 
increases in life expectancy. Th   e negotiations adhere to the 
existing collective structure of pension funds with mandatory 
participation based on employment. In June 2011, negotiators 
published their “Memorandum Detailing the Pension Accord” 
(STAR 2011). Th   e accord contains adjustments and measures 
to achieve the following ﬁ  ve goals for employment-related 
pension plans (compare Ambachtsheer 2011):
1.  Create a “future-proof system” that can adapt to chang-
ing circumstances in ﬁ  nancial markets, inﬂ  ation, and life 
expectancy.



















Key Characteristics of Dutch 
Pension Funds
Th   e following are key features of pension plans in the 
Netherlands (as of the end of 2010). Th  e  ﬁ  rst four apply 
to both DB plans with conditional indexation and 
collective DC plans, while uniform beneﬁ  t cuts apply 
only to collective DC plans.
Uniform accrual rate: Employees build up for each 
year of service around 2 percent of their (pensionable) 
wage as new pension rights. For example, a forty-year 
career gives a pension income of 80 percent of the 
average wage over the individual’s career—on average, 
around 70 percent of ﬁ  nal pay for most workers.
Uniform contribution rate: All employees pay the 
same contribution rate, which is set yearly such that 
the annual contributions match the present value of 
new accrued liabilities by employees, based on each 
additional year of service, plus buﬀ  er requirements and 
indexation goals.
Uniform indexation rate: Th   e accrued beneﬁ  ts of 
all plan participants are indexed yearly in a uniform way. 
Usually the aim is to index with the wage growth rate of 
the industry or that of the company oﬀ  ering the pension 
fund. A number of pension funds diﬀ  erentiate between 
their indexation policy for employees (indexation 
linked to wages) and retirees (indexation linked to price 
inﬂ  ation). Th   e actual indexation rate is conditional on the 
ﬁ  nancial position of the pension fund.
Uniform asset mix: Pension fund wealth is held in 
one asset mix.
Uniform reduction in nominal beneﬁ  ts: While 
DB plans have conditional indexation, the nominal level 
of beneﬁ  ts does not change. In contrast, in collective 
DC plans, nominal beneﬁ  ts—both accrued and in 
payment status—can be reduced if needed. Any such 
policy likely would be imposed as a uniform percentage 
reduction for all plan participants. Th   is provision will 
most impact participants with the highest pension 
accrual: those about to retire and those recently retired.
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proposal is to link the formal retirement 
age to life expectancy. Shocks in life 
expectancy will imply an automatic 
albeit delayed shift in retirement age. 
Th   is way, longevity risks will be borne 
by plan members themselves. Th  e 
expected replacement rate should not 
be aﬀ  ected, but it will become more 
uncertain because ﬁ  nancial market 
and longevity shocks impact pension 
beneﬁ  ts more quickly. Given the impact 
of the proposed changes on individual 
pension plans, actual implementation 
is expected to take time even when all 
stakeholders agree on the direction of 
the changes. For sure, these reforms will 
improve the resilience and sustainability 
of the Dutch pension system.
Dutch Adherence to Collective Risk-
Sharing: Explaining Differences in 
U.K. and U.S. Systems
Main differences
Pension funds in the Netherlands are 
independent ﬁ  nancial institutions gov-
erned by a board of trustees on which 
both employers and employees are 
represented. In the case of industry-
wide funds, the labor unions represent 
the employees on the board of trustees. 
In contrast, the inﬂ  uence of employ-
ers on Anglo-Saxon pension funds is 
much bigger. Th   ey are—as pension 
fund sponsors—responsible for cor-
recting situations of underfunding. 
Th  is  diﬀ  erence in the governance and 
regulation of pension funds goes a long 
way toward explaining why the shift 
to individual DC plans in the United 
States and the United Kingdom has 
been much stronger. Employers in these 
countries have shifted more ﬁ  nancial 
risks to their employees, while in the 
Netherlands risk-sharing is both col-
lective and spread more evenly among 
various stakeholders. Th  ese  diﬀ  erences 
in the responsibility of employers are 
related to the dominance of mandatory 
industry-wide pension funds in the 
Netherlands. Additionally, the role of 
unions as agents of social solidarity has 
remained important in the Netherlands. 
Th   is is an important diﬀ  erence from 
the United States, where the demise 
of DB plans seems to be related to the 
decline of unionism. Finally, in contrast 
to the United Kingdom and the United 
States, Dutch society broadly supports 
the unions’ concern for social solidar-
ity, and none of the political parties has 
come out in favor of strengthening per-
sonal pension provisions at the cost of 
second-pillar pensions.
Th   ese aspects—the shared 
governance of pension funds, the 
position of unions, and the societal 
support for social solidarity and 
collective risk-sharing—are discussed in 
greater detail below.
The Position of Employers
In Anglo-Saxon pension funds, employ-
ers contribute to the pension plans, 
direct the investments, and bear the 
risks. Moreover, employers are fully 
responsible for correcting situations of 
underfunding in DB plans. In contrast, 
in European industry-wide funds, risk is 
more diversiﬁ  ed, which gives employees 
more inﬂ  uence over their pension funds 
but also a greater role in risk-sharing 
(Laboul and Yermo 2006).
Th   us, compared with continental 
European countries, Anglo-Saxon 
countries generally have allowed for a 
much greater involvement of employers 
in the administration of pension funds, 
and employers have been given greater 
ﬂ  exibility to correct underfunding. 
However, new accounting rules have 
forced employers in Anglo-Saxon 
countries to reveal their risks in DB 
systems and to make them more 
transparent. Th   is led to a call for more 
prudent risk management practices. 
Shareholders pushed for a closer 
matching of risks and liabilities and a 
shifting of investments and longevity 
risks to employees. Just after these new 
accounting rules were implemented, 
funding ratios of U.S. and British 
pension plans fell sharply—to levels of 
80 percent (thus much deeper than the 
funding ratios of Dutch company funds), 
which caused pressure on companies to 
close their DB plans (Munnell 2006).
Similar to their counterparts in 
other continental European countries, 
pension funds in the Netherlands are 
independent ﬁ  nancial institutions 
with their own governance and 
administrative structure separate from 
that of the employers (Laboul and 
Yermo 2006). Dutch pension funds 
therefore argue that risk-sharing is 
spread more broadly in Dutch pension 
funds, that the funds and not employers 
are responsible for correcting situations 
of underfunding, and that the new 
accounting rules consequently should 
be applied diﬀ  erently for Dutch pension 
funds. Th   e legal status as a separate 
trust gives pension funds a signiﬁ  cant 
degree of operational autonomy that 
is not always present in the Anglo-
Saxon trust model (Laboul and Yermo 
2006). Employers and unions are 
represented equally on Dutch pension 
fund boards. Th   us, in contrast to the 
FIGURE 5: NOMINAL FUNDING RATIO OF A TYPICAL DUTCH PENSION PLAN,
MARCH 2007–AUGUST 2011
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Anglo-Saxon DB plans, employers 
in continental Europe are less able 
to dominate and direct pension fund 
management and policy, and therefore 
must compromise more with unions. 
Th   e other side of the coin, however, 
is that employers are not regarded as 
exclusively responsible for correcting 
situations related to underfunding 
and risk-bearing. Th   is contrast is 
accentuated by the dominance in 
the Netherlands of industry pension 
funds, which are absent in the Anglo-
Saxon world. Individual DC elements 
in pension plans are virtually absent 
within industry pension funds, and 
risk-sharing is still predominantly done 
collectively.
The Importance of Unions 
as Agents of Social Solidarity
Especially in the United States, the 
shift from DB plans to individual DC 
plans has been related to the decline 
of unionism. Ghilarducci (2006) notes 
that unions operate on the principle of 
solidarity—a context of shared inter-
ests, responsibilities, and fellowship 
that helps to explain why they prefer 
DB plans to individualistic DC plans.3 
Th   e decline in unionism, DB plans, 
and pension funding is related to the 
employment shift from large hierarchic 
manufacturing ﬁ  rms and industries 
to the more-diverse service sector 
(Munnell 2006).
In terms of membership, Dutch 
unions are not particularly strong. 
Th   ey organize around 25 percent of 
employees. Also in the Netherlands 
union membership has declined. 
However, the institutional set-up of 
labor relations gives unions a much 
stronger position than their true 
power permits (Crouch 1993). As an 
example, the coverage rate of collective 
bargaining is very high (more than 80 
percent). Th   is has to do with both the 
high organization rate of employers and 
the mandatory extension of collective 
contracts (European Commission 2004).
Furthermore, the institutional 
set-up of the pension system gives 
unions a stronger position than is 
merited by the unions’ membership 
ratio. Th   e mandatory extension of 
collective contracts historically has 
been intertwined with the mandatory 
extension of industry pension funds, 
which predominantly explains the 
high pension coverage rate in the 
Netherlands. Th   e representation of 
unions on most pension boards gives 
them a strong institutional position.
Societal and Political Support for 
Collective Risk-Sharing
Th   e shift to individualistic DC plans 
in the United States and the United 
Kingdom has a strong ideological and 
political dimension. In the 1980s, the 
conservative government of Margaret 
Th   atcher aggressively promoted the 
opt-out of collective pension plans 
and the adoption of individual pen-
sions (Munnell 2006). In the United 
States, personal pension provisions 
were high on the political agenda of the 
Republican George Bush administra-
tion. Moreover, Republican ideology 
has been pushing DC plans through 
state legislatures, while the Democrats 
and their union supporters have 
attempted to block these plans for pub-
lic workers (Wiles 2007).
In the Netherlands, in contrast, a 
shift to individual pension provisions 
is not on the political agenda. Surveys 
show that most people prefer collective 
risk-sharing over individual DC plans 
with greater investor autonomy (Rooij 
et al. 2007). Th   e willingness to share 
risk collectively and to accept its 
possible distributional consequences 
presupposes a certain degree of societal 
trust. Indeed, the European and World 
Value studies show a relatively high 
degree of social trust in the Netherlands 
(Dekker and van den Broek 2005). Such 
a high level of trust also is found in the 
Scandinavian countries. Th  ese  surveys 
also indicate that social trust seems to 
be relatively low in the United States 
and United Kingdom.
Figure 6 displays results of recent 
surveys among Dutch households 
measuring the conﬁ  dence in institutions 
in the ﬁ  eld of retirement income 
provisions over the period 2004–2011. 
Th  e  conﬁ  dence of the general public 
in Dutch pension funds has been 
very high compared to conﬁ  dence in 
the government, banks, and insurers. 
However, conﬁ  dence has declined 
signiﬁ  cantly in the aftermath of the 
credit crisis of 2008, caused by falling 
funding ratios and communications 
about possible beneﬁ  t cuts. Conﬁ  dence 
in pension funds almost fell to the same 
level as conﬁ  dence in government, but 
it remains substantially higher than the 
conﬁ  dence households have in banks 
and insurance companies.
Looking Ahead
Th   e Dutch pension system has gone 
through rough economic waters, but 
nevertheless it still may serve as an 
example for other developed, as well 
as developing, economies. Almost all 
workers are covered and the ratio of 
assets under management relative to 
GDP is the highest in the world. Th  is  is 
FIGURE 6: CONFIDENCE IN RETIREMENT INCOME PROVIDING INSTITUTIONS
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2  For an extensive overview of this process, see Ponds and van Riel (2009).
3  Compare Deken et al. (2006) for a discussion of the importance of 
social solidarity for collective pension provision.
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the result of the mandatory nature of the system run by dedi-
cated social partners who play a key role in the management 
of pension funds.
However, there are a number of threats on the horizon. 
First, the appetite to share risk collectively may collapse. 
Most pension funds stem from the 1950s and since then the 
share of pension liabilities belonging to retirees and older 
workers gradually has increased. Th   is process has created an 
imbalance that might erode the capacity to share risk with 
younger generations. More risk will be borne by the elderly, 
but this will meet strong resistance. Shifting more risk to 
the young is not a real alternative because labor scarcity will 
permit them to respond by walking away to a new job.
Second, the prospects for funding may be poor in the 
coming years. A more-global economy may go hand in 
hand with more-volatile ﬁ  nancial markets. Th   e process of 
deleveraging may depress economic growth and capital 
market returns for a long time. Furthermore, pension 
liabilities may increase when the European Central Bank gives 
in to pressure by other European nations to allow inﬂ  ation to 
rise beyond its formal 2-percent target. Financial markets do 
not provide suﬃ   cient opportunities to hedge inﬂ  ation risk.
Since 2009, a nation-wide debate has been going on that 
will lead inevitably to a restructuring of pension plans. One 
way or another, plan members will have to accept that their 
future retirement incomes increasingly depend on ﬁ  nancial 
market performance. However, it is still open as to what the 
new plans will look like and how well they will be able to 
meet the challenges of the future. 
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Endnotes
1  Compare, for example, the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 
(2011) published by the Australian Centre for Financial Studies. Th  is 
index evaluates pension systems on three criteria: adequacy, sustain-
ability, and integrity. Th   e Netherlands with Australia rank as best amid 
a broadly composed group of countries.
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